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Abstract
We develop a privatised stochastic variational inference method for Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA). The iterative nature of stochastic variational inference presents challenges: multiple itera-
tions are required to obtain accurate posterior distributions, yet each iteration increases the amount
of noise that must be added to achieve a reasonable degree of privacy. We propose a practical
algorithm that overcomes this challenge by combining: (1) an improved composition method for dif-
ferential privacy, called the moments accountant, which provides a tight bound on the privacy cost of
multiple variational inference iterations and thus significantly decreases the amount of additive noise;
and (2) privacy amplification resulting from subsampling of large-scale data. Focusing on conjugate
exponential family models, in our private variational inference, all the posterior distributions will be
privatised by simply perturbing expected sufficient statistics. Using Wikipedia data, we illustrate
the effectiveness of our algorithm for large-scale data.
1 Background
Differential Privacy (DP) is a formal definition of the privacy properties of data analysis algo-
rithms [1, 2]. A randomized algorithm M(X) is said to be (, δ)-differentially private if
Pr(M(X) ∈ S) ≤ exp()Pr(M(X′) ∈ S) + δ (1)
for all measurable subsets S of the range of M and for all datasets X, X′ differing by a single entry
(either by excluding that entry or replacing it with a new entry). Here, an entry usually corresponds
to a single individual’s private value. If δ = 0, the algorithm is said to be -differentially private, and
if δ > 0, it is said to be approximately differentially private. Intuitively, the definition states that
the probability of any event does not change very much when a single individual’s data is modified,
thereby limiting the amount of information that the algorithm reveals about any one individual.
We observe that M is a randomized algorithm, and randomization is achieved by either adding
external noise, or by subsampling. In this paper, we use the “include/exclude” version of DP, in
which differing by a single entry refers to the inclusion or exclusion of that entry in the dataset.
Variational inference for the conjugate exponential models Variational inference is an
optimization-based posterior inference method, which simplifies to a two-step procedure when the
model falls into the Conjugate-Exponential (CE) class of models. CE family models satisfy two
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conditions [3]:
(1) The complete-data likelihood is in the exponential family :
p(Dn, ln|m) = g(m)f(Dn, ln) exp(n(m)>s(Dn, ln)), (2)
(2) The prior over m is conjugate to the complete-data likelihood :
p(m |τ,ν) = h(τ,ν)g(m)τ exp(ν>n(m)). (3)
where natural parameters and sufficient statistics of the complete-data likelihood are denoted by
n(m) and s(Dn, ln), respectively, and g, f, h are some known functions. The hyperparameters are
denoted by τ (a scalar) and ν (a vector).
The variational inference algorithm for a CE family model optimises the lower bound on the model
log marginal likelihood given by,
L(q(l)q(m)) =
∫
dm dl q(l)q(m) log
p(l ,D,m)
q(l)q(m)
, (4)
where we assume that the joint approximate posterior distribution over the latent variables and
model parameters q(l ,m) is factorised via the mean-field assumption as q(l ,m) = q(l)q(m) =
q(m)
∏N
n=1 q(ln), and that each of the variational distributions also has the form of an exponential
family distribution. Computing the derivatives of the variational lower bound in Eq. 4 with respect to
each of these variational distributions and setting them to zero yield the following two-step procedure.
(1) First, given expected natural parameters n¯, the E-step computes:
q(l) =
N∏
n=1
q(ln) ∝
N∏
n=1
f(Dn, ln) exp(n¯>s(Dn, ln)) =
N∏
n=1
p(ln|Dn, n¯). (5)
Using q(l), it outputs expected sufficient statistics, the expectation of s(Dn, ln)
with probability density q(ln) : s¯(D) = 1N
N∑
n=1
〈s(Dn, ln)〉q(ln).
(2) Second, given expected sufficient statistics s¯(D), the M-step computes:
q(m) = h(τ˜ , ν˜)g(m)τ˜ exp(ν˜>n(m)), where τ˜ = τ +N, ν˜ = ν +N s¯(D). (6)
Using q(m), it outputs expected natural parameters n¯ = 〈n(m)〉q(m).
2 Privacy preserving VI algorithm for CE family
The only place where the algorithm looks at the data is when computing the expected sufficient
statistics s¯(D) in the first step. The expected sufficient statistics then dictates the expected nat-
ural parameters in the second step. So, perturbing the sufficient statistics leads to perturbing
both posterior distributions q(l) and q(m). Perturbing sufficient statistics in exponential fami-
lies is also used in [4]. Existing work focuses on privatising posterior distributions in the context
of posterior sampling [5, 6, 7, 8], while our work focuses on privatising approximate posterior dis-
tributions for optimisation-based approximate Bayesian inference. Suppose there are two neigh-
bouring datasets D and D′, where there is only one datapoint difference among them. We also
assume that the dataset is pre-processed such that the L2 norm of any datapoint is less than
1. The maximum difference in the expected sufficient statistics given the datasets, e.g., the L-
1 sensitivity of the expected sufficient statistics is given by (assuming s is a vector of length L)
∆s = maxD,D′,q(l),q(l ′)
∑L
l=1
1
N |Eq(l)sl(D, l)−Eq(l ′)sl(D′, l ′)|.Under some models like LDA below, ex-
pected sufficient statistic has a limited sensitivity, in which case we add noise to each coordinate of
the expected sufficient statistics to compensate the maximum change.
2
3 Privacy preserving latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA)
The most successful topic modeling is based on LDA, where the generative process is given by [9].
Its generative process is given by
• Draw topics βk ∼ Dirichlet (η1V ), for k = {1, . . . ,K}, where η is a scalar hyperarameter.
• For each document d ∈ {1, . . . , D}
– Draw topic proportions θd ∼ Dirichlet (α1K), where α is a scalar hyperarameter.
– For each word n ∈ {1, . . . , N}
∗ Draw topic assignments zdn ∼ Discrete(θd)
∗ Draw word wdn ∼ Discrete(βzdn)
where each observed word is represented by an indicator vector wdn (nth word in the dth document) of
length V , and where V is the number of terms in a fixed vocabulary set. The topic assignment latent
variable zdn is also an indicator vector of length K, where K is the number of topics. The LDA model
falls in the CE family, viewing zd,1:N and θd as two types of latent variables: ld = {zd,1:N ,θd}, and β
as model parameters m = β. The conditions for CE are satisfied: (1) the complete-data likelihood
is in exponential family: p(wd,1:N , zd,1:N ,θd|β) ∝ f(Dd, zd,1:N ,θd) exp(
∑
n
∑
k[logβk]
>[zkdnwdn]),
where f(Dd, zd,1:N ,θd) ∝ exp([α1K ]>[log θd] +
∑
n
∑
k z
k
dn log θ
k
d); and (2) we have a conjugate prior
over βk: p(βk|η1V ) ∝ exp([η1V ]>[logβk]), for k = {1, . . . ,K}. For simplicity, we assume hyperpa-
rameters α and η are set manually. Under the LDA model, we assume the variational posteriors are
given by
• Discrete : q(zkdn|φkdn) ∝ exp(zkdn logφkdn), with variational parameters for capturing the poste-
rior topic assignment, φkdn ∝ exp(〈logβk〉q(βk)>wdn + 〈log θkd〉q(θd)).
• Dirichlet : q(θd|γd) ∝ exp(γd> log θd),where γd = α1K +
∑N
n=1〈zdn〉q(zdn),
where these two distributions are computed in the E-step behind the privacy wall. The expected
sufficient statistics are s¯vk =
1
D
∑
d
∑
n〈zkdn〉q(zdn)wvdn = 1D
∑
d
∑
nφ
k
dnwdn. Then, in the M-step, we
compute the posterior
• Dirichlet : q(βk|λk) ∝ exp(λk> logβk), where λk = η1V +
∑
d
∑
n〈zkdn〉q(zdn)wdn.
Sensitivity analysis In a large-scale data setting, it is impossible to handle the entire dataset
at once. In such case, stochastic learning using noisy sufficient statistics computed on mini-batches
of data. At each learning step with a freshly drawn mini-batch of data (size S), we perturb the
expected sufficient statistics. While each document has a different document length Nd, we limit the
maximum length of any document to N by randomly selecting N words in a document if the number
of words in the document is longer than N .
We add Gaussian noise to each component of the expected sufficient statistics, which is a matrix of
size K × V ,
˜¯svk = s¯
v
k + Y
v
k , where Y
v
k ∼ N (0, σ2(∆s¯)2), (7)
where s¯vk =
1
S
∑
d
∑
nφ
k
dnw
v
dn, and ∆s¯ is the sensitivity. We then map the perturbed components to
3
0 if they become negative. For LDA, the worst-case sensitivity is given by
∆s¯ = max
|D\D′|=1
√∑
k
∑
v
(s¯vk(D)− s¯vk(D′))2,
= max
|D\D′|=1
√√√√∑
k
∑
v
(
1
S
∑
n
S∑
d=1
φkdnw
v
dn −
1
S − 1
∑
n
S−1∑
d=1
φkdnw
v
dn
)2
,
= max
|D\D′|=1
√√√√∑
k
∑
v
∣∣∣∣∣S − 1S 1S − 1 ∑
n
S−1∑
d=1
φkdnw
v
dn +
1
S
∑
n
φkSnw
v
Sn −
1
S − 1
∑
n
S−1∑
d=1
φkdnw
v
dn
∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
= max
φkSn,w
v
Sn
√√√√∑
k
∑
v
∣∣∣∣∣ 1S∑
n
φkSnw
v
Sn −
1
S
(
1
S − 1
∑
n
S−1∑
d=1
φkdnw
v
dn
)∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
= max
φkSn,w
v
Sn
√√√√∑
k
∑
v
∣∣∣∣∣ 1S∑
n
φkSnw
v
Sn
∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
since 0 ≤ φkdn ≤ 1, wvdn ∈ {0, 1}, and we assume 0 ≤ 1S−1
∑
n
∑S−1
d=1 φ
k
dnw
v
dn ≤
∑
n φ
k
Snw
v
Sn,
≤ max
φkSn,w
v
Sn
1
S
∑
n
(
∑
k
φkSn)(
∑
v
wvSn) ≤
N
S
, (8)
since
∑
k φ
k
Sn = 1, and
∑
v w
v
Sn = 1. This sensitivity accounts for the worst case in which all
NS words in the minibatch are assigned to the same entry of s¯, i.e. they all have the same word
type v, and are hard-assigned to the same topic k in the variational distribution. In our practical
implementation, we improve the sensitivity by exploiting the fact that most typical sufficient statistic
matrix s¯ given a minibatch (where the size of the matrix is the number of topics by the number of
words in the vocabulary set) has a much smaller norm than this worst case. Specifically, inspired
by [10], we apply a norm clipping strategy, in which the matrix s¯ is clipped (or projected) such that
the Frobenious norm of the matrix is bounded by |s¯| ≤ aNS , for a user-specified a ∈ (0, 1]. For each
minibatch, if this criterion is not satisfied, we project the expected sufficient statistics down to the
required norm via
s¯ := a
N
S
s¯
|s¯| . (9)
After this the procedure, the sensitivity of the entire matrix becomes a∆s¯ (i.e., aN/S), and we add
noise on this scale to the clipped expected sufficient statistics. We set a = 0.1 in our experiments,
which empirically resulted in clipping being applied to around 3/4 of the documents. The resulting
algorithm is summarised in Algorithm 1.
4 Privacy analysis of private LDA
We use the Moments Accountant (MA) composition method [10] for accounting for privacy loss
incurred by successive iterations of an iterative mechanism. We choose this method as it provides
tight privacy bounds (cf., [11]). The moments accountant method is based on the concept of a
privacy loss random variable, which allows us to consider the entire spectrum of likelihood ratios
Pr(M(X)=o)
Pr(M(X′)=o) induced by a privacy mechanism M. Specifically, the privacy loss random variable
corresponding to a mechanism M, datasets X and X′, and an auxiliary parameter w is a random
variable defined as follows: LM(X,X′, w) := log
Pr(M(X,w)=o)
Pr(M(X′,w)=o) , with likelihood Pr(M(X, w) = o),
where o lies in the range of M. Observe that if M is (, 0)-differentially private, then the absolute
value of LM(X,X′, w) is at most  with probability 1.
The moments accountant method exploits properties of this privacy loss random variable to account
for the privacy loss incurred by applying mechanismsM1, . . . ,Mt successively to a dataset X; this is
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Algorithm 1 Private LDA
Require: Data D. Define D (documents), V (vocabulary), K (number of topics).
Define ρt = (τ0 + t)
−κ, mini-batch size S, hyperparameters α, η, σ2, and a
Ensure: Privatised expected natural parameters 〈logβk〉q(βk) and sufficient statistics ˜¯s.
Compute the sensitivity of the expected sufficient statistics given in Eq. 8.
for t = 1, . . . , J do
(1) E-step: Given expected natural parameters 〈logβk〉q(βk)
for d = 1, . . . , S do
Compute q(zkdn) parameterised by φ
k
dn ∝ exp(〈logβk〉q(βk)>wdn + 〈log θkd〉q(θd)).
Compute q(θd) parameterised by γd = α1K +
∑N
n=1〈zdn〉q(zdn).
end for
Compute the expected sufficient statistics s¯vk =
1
S
∑
d
∑
nφ
k
dnw
v
dn.
if |s¯| > aN/S then
s¯ := aNS
s¯
|s¯|
end if
Output the perturbed expected sufficient statistics ˜¯svk = s¯ + Y
v
k , where Y
v
k is Gaussian noise
given in Eq. 7, but using sensitivity aN/S.
Clip negative entries of ˜¯s to 0.
Update the log-moment functions.
(2) M-step: Given perturbed expected sufficient statistics ˜¯sk,
Compute q(βk) parameterised by λ
(t)
k = η1V +D˜¯sk.
Set λ(t) ←[ (1− ρt)λ(t−1) + ρtλ(t).
Output expected natural parameters 〈logβk〉q(βk).
end for
done by bounding properties of the log of the moment generating function of the privacy loss random
variable. Specifically, the log moment function αMt of a mechanism Mt is defined as:
αMt(λ) = sup
X,X′,w
logE[exp(λLMt(X,X′, w))], (10)
where X and X′ are datasets that differ in the private value of a single person. [10] shows that ifM
is the combination of mechanisms (M1, . . . ,Mk) where each mechanism addes independent noise,
then, its log moment generating function αM has the property that:
αM(λ) ≤
k∑
t=1
αMt(λ) (11)
Additionally, given a log moment function αM, the corresponding mechanismM satisfies a range of
privacy parameters (, δ) connected by the following equation:
δ = min
λ
exp(αM(λ)− λ) (12)
These properties immediately suggest a procedure for tracking privacy loss incurred by a combination
of mechanisms M1, . . . ,Mk on a dataset. For each mechanism Mt, first compute the log moment
function αMt ; for simple mechanisms such as the Gaussian mechanism this can be done by simple
algebra. Next, compute αM for the combinationM = (M1, . . . ,Mk) from (11), and finally, recover
the privacy parameters of M using (12) by either finding the best  for a target δ or the best δ for
a target . In some special cases such as composition of k Gaussian mechanisms, the log moment
functions can be calculated in closed form; the more common case is when closed forms are not
available, and then a grid search may be performed over λ.
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Figure 1: Epsilon versus perplexity, varying σ and S, Wikipedia data, one epoch. The parameters
for the two data points indicated by the pink circles do not satisfy the conditions of the moments
accountant composition theorem, so those  values are not formally proved.
In Algorithm 1, observe that iteration t of the algorithm subsamples a ν = S/D fraction of the
dataset, computes the sufficient statistics based on this subsample, and perturbs it using the Gaussian
mechanism with variance σ2Id. To simplify the privacy calculations, we assume that each example
in the dataset is included in a minibatch according to an independent coin flip with probability ν.
From Proposition 1.6 in [12] along with simple algebra, the log moment function of the Gaussian
Mechanism M applied to a query with L2-sensitivity ∆ is αM(λ) = λ(λ+1)∆
2
2σ2
. To compute the
log moment function for the subsampled Gaussian Mechanism, we follow [10]. Let β0 and β1 be
the densities N (0, (σ/∆)2) and N (1, (σ/∆)2), and let β = (1 − ν)β0 + νβ1 be the mixture density;
then, the log moment function at λ is max log(E1, E2) where E1 = Ez∼β0 [(β0(z)/β(z))λ] and E2 =
Ez∼β[(β(z)/β0(z))λ]. E1 and E2 can be numerically calculated for any λ, and we maintain the log
moments over a grid of λ values.
Note that our algorithms are run for a prespecified number of iterations, and with a prespecified
σ; this ensures a certain level of (, δ) guarantee in the released expected sufficient statistics from
Algorithm 1.
5 Experiments using Wikipedia data
We downloaded a random D = 400, 000 documents from Wikipedia to test our algorithm. We used
50 topics and a vocabulary set of approximately 8000 terms. The algorithm was run for one epoch
in each experiment.
We compared our moments accountant approach with a baseline method using the strong compo-
sition (Theorem 3.20 of [1]), resulting from the max divergence of the privacy loss random vari-
able being bounded by a total budget including a slack variable δ, which yields (J′(e′ − 1) +√
2J log(1/δ′′)′, δ′′ + Jδ′)-DP.
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As our evaluation metric, we compute an upper bound on the perplexity on held-out documents.
Perplexity is an information-theoretic measure of the predictive performance of probabilistic models
which is commonly used in the context of language modeling [13]. The perplexity of a probabilistic
model pmodel(x) on a test set of N data points xi (e.g. words in a corpus) is defined as
perplexity(Dtest,λ) ≤ exp
−(∑
i
〈log p(ntest,θi, zi|λ)〉q(θi,zi) − 〈log q(θ, z)〉q(θ,z)
)
/
∑
i,n
ntesti,n
 ,
where ntesti is a vector of word counts for the ith document, n
test = {ntesti }Ii=1. In the above, we use
the λ that was calculated during training. We compute the posteriors over z and θ by performing
the first step in our algorithm using the test data and the perturbed sufficient statistics we obtain
during training. We adapted the python implementation by the authors of [14] for our experiments.
Figure 1 shows the trade-off between  and per-word perplexity on the Wikipedia dataset for the dif-
ferent methods under a variety of conditions, in which we varied the value of σ ∈ {1.0, 1.1, 1.24, 1.5, 2}
and the minibatch size S ∈ {5, 000, 10, 000, 20, 000}. We found that the moments accountant com-
position substantially outperformed strong composition in each of these settings. Here, we used
relatively large minibatches, which were necessary to control the signal-to-noise ratio in order to
obtain reasonable results for private LDA. Larger minibatches thus had lower perplexity. However,
due to its impact on the subsampling rate, increasing S comes at the cost of a higher  for a fixed
number of documents processed (in our case, one epoch). The minibatch size S is limited by the
conditions of the moments accountant composition theorem shown by [10], with the largest valid
value being obtained at around S ≈ 20, 000 for the small noise regime where σ ≈ 1.
In Table 1, for each method, we show the top 10 words in terms of assigned probabilities for 3 example
topics. Non-private LDA results in the most coherent words among all the methods. For the private
LDA models with a total privacy budget  = 2.44 (S = 20, 000, σ = 1.24), as we move from moments
accountant to strong composition, the amount of noise added gets larger, and the topics become less
coherent. We also observe that the probability mass assigned to the most probable words decreases
with the noise, and thus strong composition gave less probability to the top words compared to the
other methods.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a practical privacy-preserving topic modeling algorithm which outputs accurate
and privatized expected sufficient statistics and expected natural parameters. Our approach uses
the moments accountant analysis combined with the privacy amplification effect due to subsampling
of data, which significantly decrease the amount of additive noise for the same expected privacy
guarantee compared to the standard analysis.
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Table 1: Posterior topics from private ( = 2.44) and non-private LDA
Non-private Moments Acc. Strong Comp.
topic 33: topic 33: topic 33:
german 0.0244 function 0.0019 resolution 0.0003
system 0.0160 domain 0.0017 northward 0.0003
group 0.0109 german 0.0011 deeply 0.0003
based 0.0089 windows 0.0011 messages 0.0003
science 0.0077 software 0.0010 research 0.0003
systems 0.0076 band 0.0007 dark 0.0003
computer 0.0072 mir 0.0006 river 0.0003
software 0.0071 product 0.0006 superstition 0.0003
space 0.0061 resolution 0.0006 don 0.0003
power 0.0060 identity 0.0005 found 0.0003
topic 35: topic 35: topic 35:
station 0.0846 station 0.0318 station 0.0118
line 0.0508 line 0.0195 line 0.0063
railway 0.0393 railway 0.0149 railway 0.0055
opened 0.0230 opened 0.0074 opened 0.0022
services 0.0187 services 0.0064 services 0.0015
located 0.0163 closed 0.0056 stations 0.0015
closed 0.0159 code 0.0054 closed 0.0014
owned 0.0158 country 0.0052 section 0.0013
stations 0.0122 located 0.0051 platform 0.0012
platform 0.0109 stations 0.0051 company 0.0010
topic 37: topic 37: topic 37:
born 0.1976 born 0.0139 born 0.0007
american 0.0650 people 0.0096 american 0.0006
people 0.0572 notable 0.0092 street 0.0006
summer 0.0484 american 0.0075 charles 0.0004
notable 0.0447 name 0.0031 said 0.0004
canadian 0.0200 mountain 0.0026 events 0.0004
event 0.0170 japanese 0.0025 people 0.0003
writer 0.0141 fort 0.0025 station 0.0003
dutch 0.0131 character 0.0019 written 0.0003
actor 0.0121 actor 0.0014 point 0.0003
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